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Abstract (English) 
 
The purpose of my thesis was to illustrate how the regulation of drug prices affects 
pharmaceutical companies R&D investments. Several publications have been made 
dealing with this topic, which I briefly summarized in the first part of my thesis. After 
that I summarized the prevailing regulatory schemes that are used to regulate drug 
prices and discussed their possible effects. The most important part of my thesis is 
the empirical part where I try to verify the impact of price regulation on R&D 
spending. For my estimation I used a panel data set containing the 20 biggest 
pharmaceutical companies in terms of sales in the period of 2000 to 2008. As a 
regulation proxy I used the share of sales made in the EMEA region, share of sales 
made in the US and share of sales in the rest of the world based on the assumption, 
that in the EMEA region prices underlie stricter price regulation compared to the US. 
The main result out of my fixed effects estimation is that price regulation has a 
significant negative impact on pharmaceutical companies´ R&D investments; this 
negative impact is even reinforced the more sales a company makes in the EMEA 
region. By way of comparison I also performed a random effects estimation with the 
same variable, which provides consistent results.      
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Chapter 1 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Pharmaceuticals play a very important role in health care. A general trend towards 
more consumption per capital in the industrialized countries can be observed due to 
society´s demographic change. More consumption causes more costs for the 
purchasers of drugs, which are usually governmental health insurances in the case of 
prescribed drugs. Since total costs of health care system are increasing due to an 
aging society policy-makers try do reduce costs among other things by regulating 
drug prices. This is an important issue, because a balancing act has to be made 
between low drug prices and keeping the incentive and resources for pharmaceutical 
companies to invest in R&D. In the first chapter of my thesis I want to provide an 
overview of existing empirical studies dealing with the issue how the regulation of 
drug prices can affect firms´ R&D investments. In the second part I want to say a few 
words about price regulation and the most common techniques to regulate drug 
prices. In the third part I estimated the effects of drug price regulation on R&D 
spending using the share of sales in the different regions as regulation proxies based 
on the assumption that compared to Europe, drug prices in the US are largely 
unregulated and could derive some conclusions out of my estimation.   
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1.2. Review of the literature 
 
The relationship between price regulation and profit margin has just been recently in 
the focus of some econometrical papers. One very important work by Vernon (2003)1 
focused on the relationship between price regulation and profit margin. He used a 
panel data set containing the 20 biggest pharmaceutical companies from 1994 to 
1999. The main assumption was that drug prices in the US largely remain 
unregulated compared with the rest of the world, therefore he used the share of 
companies´ sales made in the non US market as indicator of regulation. According to 
his results an increase of 10 percentage points in share of sales made in the non US 
market would result in a decline of 2.7 to 3.5 percentage points in profit margin, which 
might have a negative influence in terms of R&D expenditures.  
In a next step Vernon (2005)2 established the lagged cash flow and the expected 
profit to be key determinants of pharmaceutical companies´ R&D spending, which 
both might be influenced by price regulation. For his estimation he used a panel data 
set of the 14 biggest pharmaceutical companies in the period of 1994 to 1997. Again, 
he assumes drug prices in the US to be less regulated compared to the rest of the 
world. Then he tried to simulate the impact if the US theoretically implemented a new 
regulation policy, which would cut drug prices. He concluded this implementation 
would result in a decline in firms´ R&D expenditures between 23.4 and 32.7 percent. 
These results cannot be used to make a statement on the impact of social welfare, 
because it is impossible to quantify the innovative productivity of the R&D loss, but 
nevertheless he could show that price regulation might have a negative impact on 
R&D investments. 
In a very recent study Civan and Maloney (2009)3 tried to estimate the price elasticity 
of drug development out of the fact, that the number pharmaceuticals which are 
standing in the development process feature a highly positive correlation with the 
price of already existing pharmaceuticals within this therapeutic area. A cross 
                                                          
1 VERNON JOHN A., (2003). The Relationship between Price Regulation and Pharmaceutical Profit 
Margins, Applied Economics Letters 10: pp. 467-470 
2 VERNON JOHN A., (2005). Examining the link between price regulation and pharmaceutical R&D 
investment, Health Economics 14: pp. 1-16  
3 CIVAN ABDULKADIR, MALONEY MICHAEL T., (2009). The Effect of Price on Pharmaceutical R&D, 
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 9: Iss. 1 (Contributions), Article 15 
 
10
sectional analysis of the prices of 600 drugs was used in order to estimate the 
average price elasticity which accounts for 35 percent on average and is even 0.51 in 
their preferred specification. An elasticity of 0.51 would mean that if there was a price 
cut of 50 percent on existing drugs in a certain therapeutic area it would reduce the 
number of drugs in the development pipeline of this therapeutic area by 25 percent, 
keeping all other factors constant. Of course some caveats have to be considered, 
for example the findings might not be valid for across-the-board price cutting, but 
estimating the price elasticities of drugs in different therapeutic areas is an interesting 
approach to illustrate the loss of new pharmaceuticals due to price cutting.  
Another interesting work with a different approach performing a prospective micro-
simulation was published by Abbot and Vernon (2007)4. In order to do this simulation 
Monte Carlo techniques were used. They could show that price controls have a 
negative impact on pharmaceutical companies´ willingness to invest capital in early-
stage R&D. According to their results, a price cut of 40 to 50 percent of drug prices in 
the US will lead to a decline between 30 and 60 percent of investments in R&D 
projects concerning early-stage development.  
When summarizing these empirical studies, it seems that there is indeed a negative 
impact of drug price regulation on R&D investments to a certain extent.            
  
                                                          
4 ABBOTT THOMAS A., VERNON JOHN A., (2007). The Cost of US Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation: A Financial Simulation Model of R&D Decisions, Managerial and Decision Economics 28: 
pp. 293-306 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
2.1. Price regulation 
 
The main goal of price regulation is to maximize society´s total welfare, no matter 
what kind of price regulation applies. There is a tradeoff between static efficiency and 
dynamic efficiency. Static efficiency focuses on maximizing the present welfare, 
where in the most extreme case prices equal short-run marginal costs by reason of 
price regulation. This approach only aims at the present welfare and can have an 
adverse effect on future periods since companies would not be able to make any 
profits meaning that there is no capital available for investments. Without investments 
a technological progress, which might raise welfare, would not be possible. Assuming 
that drug prices would equal their marginal costs, no resources would be available to 
be invested in R&D and that would result in a loss of new innovative drugs that would 
contribute to raise society´s total welfare. On the other hand dynamic efficiency is 
focused on maximizing long-term welfare, thus prices equal long-term marginal costs, 
which consist of the marginal costs where long-term expenditures such as R&D and 
investments are included to some extent. Compared to static efficiency consumers 
most likely will face higher prices, at least in the short-term. Nowadays it seems to be 
common that politicians are in favor of static efficiency in order to profit from lower 
prices rather than focusing on future welfare.  
 
2.2. Mechanisms of regulating drug prices 
 
2.2.1. External price benchmarking 
External price benchmarking is the most used technique in order to cut prices of 
pharmaceuticals within the OECD countries. The basic idea of this regulation scheme 
is to introduce a price cap for a newly launched drug, which depends on the price of 
this drug in predetermined countries. The criteria of the selection of these so-called 
benchmark countries might differ substantially, but usually the benchmark countries 
are selected based on their economic and/or geographic proximity, thus European 
countries are prone to use other European countries as reference countries. For 
example, Austria uses the average drug price of all European union´s member states 
12
as reference where the medicinal product is approved (PPRI, 2007, p.36)5. The 
practice of external price benchmarking can be explained as follows: once a new 
pharmaceutical is brought to a country´s market, the manufacturing pharmaceutical 
company submits a price proposal to the regulatory authority. The authority evaluates 
the adequacy of the proposed price by comparing it to the price of the same drug in 
the selected benchmark countries. The manufacturing pharmaceutical company´s 
proposed price is rejected if it is higher than the average drug price in the reference 
countries; it is obvious that external price benchmarking is only partly suitable for 
first- or early launch countries, which face the problem of directly negotiating the price 
with the pharmaceutical company. This might be difficult due to the correct evaluation 
of the degree of differentiation and the level of substitutability from already existing 
drugs in the same therapeutic area. 
 
2.2.2. Internal reference pricing 
Internal reference pricing is a commonly used regulation scheme where 
pharmaceuticals are grouped in therapeutic areas and priced by comparing the price 
with competitor drugs within this therapeutic area. The requirement for the realization 
of this form of price regulation is that there are already similar drugs available on the 
domestic market, so it is particularly appreciable to generics and “me-too” products. A 
generic is an almost identical copy6 of an original drug, whose patent has expired, 
whereas a “me-too” product might be the best within its therapeutic area due to an 
increase in efficacy of an already explored mechanism of action. There are of course 
differences of internal reference pricing among countries, but the main principals are 
equal. The price setting process is similar to external price benchmarking, the 
regulatory authority evaluates the key characteristics of the pharmaceutical that 
wants to enter the market and puts it into a therapeutic area which contain similar or 
(in case of generics) identical drugs. The price of these similar or identical drugs is 
used as reference and the pharmaceutical company´s proposed price is adapted 
accordingly. For the special case of generics, many countries use a separate internal 
reference system, which constrains generic prices to be a fixed fraction of the original 
                                                          
5 ARTS DANIELLE, HABL CLAUDIA, LEOPOLD CHRISTINE, WINDISCH FRIEDERIKE, (2007). 
Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Information Austria 
6 Differences are only allowed in the manufacturing process and supplying ingredients  
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product, which patent has expired. 17 member states7 of the European Union used 
internal reference pricing in 2008, especially countries with a high quantity of 
generics on the market. A very difficult question when applying internal price 
referencing is how to evaluate the additional benefit of one drug relative to another, 
already existing drug. If there are vast improvements towards existing drugs of the 
same therapeutic area, the evaluation might be very hard as it is based on the 
evaluation of life8. Another problem of this regulation scheme is to value gradual 
improvements of existing drugs. Some countries do not allow a premium price to be 
gained for drugs whose improvement is not vast compared to existing therapeutic 
alternatives. In other countries a premium is allowed to be obtained for gradual 
improved drugs and thus the question is raised who should pay this premium, either 
the payer due to a higher reimbursement price or the patient through additional cost 
sharing.    
    
2.2.3. Pharmaco-economic assessment 
To use pharmaco-economic assessment in order to evaluate the appropriate price of 
newly developed pharmaceuticals is a rather new approach, which was first of all 
introduced in Australia in 1993. To the present, many countries have employed this 
evaluation system to confirm their pricing and reimbursement decisions. Pharmaco-
economic assessment usually describes a cost-effectiveness analysis, where the 
additional costs of new pharmaceutical products are contrasted with the additional 
effect related to health outcomes. If there is already a therapeutic alternative on the 
market, incremental cost-effectiveness is employed in order to determine if the new 
drug is “worth” the additional cost. In case there is no comparable drug on the 
market, an implicit or explicit cost-effective threshold has to be set9. Among 
pharmaco-economic assessment, cost-effectiveness studies are the most prevalent, 
but in particular circumstances cost-benefit or cost-utility analyses are also 
performed. While a cost-benefit analysis only captures the quantity of life a drug 
would save, a cost-effectiveness analysis is more considerable including the quality 
                                                          
7 According to PPRI 2008: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Finland, 
France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and the UK. 
8 Additional utility of new drugs is often measured in improvements in the quality of life and the 
quantity of life  
9see EICHLER HANS-GEORG, GERTH WILLIAM C., JÖNSSON BENGT, KONG SHELDON X., 
(2004). Use of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health-Care Resource Allocation Decision-Making: How 
are Cost-Effectiveness Thresholds Expected to Emerge, Value in Health Vol. 7 No. 5: pp. 518-528 
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of life as well. The quality of life can be scaled as quality-adjusted life years (QALY), 
which is commonly used in pharmaco-economic assessment. The idea behind QALY 
is to attach weight to life years in terms of medical condition. A year of life without any 
disability is rated with a factor of 1; in contrast a year of life with a physical 
impairment is weighted with a value lower than 1. In the next step, it is to monetarily 
quantify one QALY in order to use it as parameter of a pharma-economic 
assessment. The value of a QALY can differ among countries, for example a QALY 
in the UK is considered to be 30 000 GBP where in the US it is considered to be      
50 000 USD10. When taking in account all these factors it might be clear that 
pharmaco-economic assessment itself is multidisciplinary and technically 
challenging. Therefore smaller or lower-income countries might face the problem of 
providing adequate resources and often settle for other countries´ pharmaco-
economic assessment or pharmaceutical companies´ assessment. Many countries 
have established government institutes which attend to pharma-economic 
assessment.  
 
Risk-sharing 
Sometimes it might be difficult for payers to make a decision whether to purchase 
drugs due to a lack of robust outcome analysis at the time the purchase decision is 
made. In order to cushion this risk a risk-sharing agreement can be made to set 
targets for the outcome of a pharmaceutical product, where for one medical indication 
an expected outcome is determined. When these goals cannot be reached, the 
pharmaceutical company has to partly rebate the costs11. This “outcome guarantee” 
is especially interesting for new costly medication where the outcome is questionable. 
Due to the shared risk between purchaser and pharmaceutical company patients 
gain access to new expensive pharmaceutical products and for the pharmaceutical 
firms it is easier to sell their products.       
                                                          
10 see respectively DELVIN NANCY, PARKIN DAVID, (2004). Does NICE Have a Cost-Effectiveness 
Threshold and What Other Factors Influence Its Decisions? A Discrete-Choice Analysis, Health 
Economics 13: pp. 437-452  
CHANG TING-TSUNG, CHEN PEI-JER, CHUANG WAN-LONG, SULLIVAN SEAN D., PATEL 
KAVITA, TSAI CHIAMING, VEENSTRA DAVID L., (2007). Cost effectiveness of peginterferon alfa-2a 
compared to lamivudine treatment in patients with hepatitis B e antigen positive chronic hepatitis B in 
Taiwan, Journal of Gastroenterology and Hepatology 22: pp. 1494-1499 
11 CHAPMAN STEVE, DURIEUX PIERRE, WALLEY TOM, (2004). Good Prescribing Behavior, in 
Regulating Pharmaceuticals in Europe: Striving for Efficiency, Equity and Quality, Open University 
Press, Maidenhead 
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 2.3. Trends and conclusions 
 
The prior overview of different approaches to regulate drug prices gives an idea how 
policy makers can influence drug prices. Of course the regulation schemes differ to 
some extent among countries, which is in contrast to the global process of 
discovering and developing new drugs. Pricing and reimbursement policies have to 
manage the balancing act between encouraging pharmaceutical innovation and 
holding down drug prices. A general trend towards cost-effectiveness evaluation can 
be observed among countries meaning that the pricing process is more transparent 
and evidence-based, which results in a better predictability of regulation decisions for 
pharmaceutical companies. The advantages of this kind of transparent regulation are 
obvious, but on the other hand it is more costly and can be made responsible to 
make the regulation process even more complex for both, payers and pharmaceutical 
companies. 
 
2.4. Effects of price regulation 
 
When reviewing the existing literature that deals with the effects of price regulation 
there is a broad consensus that it has detrimental effects on the costs and quality of 
medical care, but in theory ambiguous effects can be discussed. There is an indirect 
and a direct way how price regulation can influence the costs and quality of medical 
care. The former influences medical care through R&D spending. As Vernon (2004) 
identifies the lagged cash flow12 and the expected profits to be the most important 
determinates for pharmaceutical companies´ R&D spending, both of these 
determinates are influenced by price regulation. If firms´ expected profits are revised 
downwards due to price regulation, less external capital will be available to be spent 
on R&D. Cash flows are also lowered due to price regulation, with the difference that 
this effect operates with a lag of one year, thus the allocation of resources to R&D 
might be reduced. Reduced R&D spending is supposed to result in less innovative 
new drugs. According to Danzon (1997, chapter 5)13 this effect is reinforced by 
                                                          
12 It is a challenging process for a pharmaceutical company to decide how much to spend on R&D and 
in order to simplify this question the cash flow of the previous year is used as one of the determinants 
to define the current period´s R&D investment.  
13 DANZON PATRICIA M., (1997). Pharmaceutical Price Regulation, AEI Press 
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applying most kinds of price regulation. It seems to be comprehensible that less R&D 
spending will result in a decline of newly discovered chemical entities, which might 
affect society in two different ways. Assuming that the costs of regulation in terms of 
higher mortality or morbidity are higher than the savings in R&D spending might 
result in a less cost-effective health care. In case R&D savings are higher than the 
costs of regulation, it might result in a more cost-effective health care, but the former 
seems to be more feasible. 
Price regulation can also directly influence medical care by reducing the price of 
existing drugs. Lower drug prices could cause greater use and therefore might 
contribute to higher quality and reduction of overall costs. Cutting the prices of drugs 
might lead to adverse effects on the availability of new drugs, because 
pharmaceutical countries will first launch their new pharmaceuticals in countries, 
where drug prices are subject to less regulation. Another reason for firms to delay the 
launch in strictly regulated markets is that low drug prices in a country could be 
referenced for other countries, as being used in external price benchmarking.  
As the effects of price regulation seem to be ambiguous to a certain degree, it is a 
very important issue for policy-makers. Several publications have been made dealing 
with this topic and in the following chapter I want to summarize the most important 
empirical findings.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
3.1. Hypothesis part 
 
I wanted to examine the influence of the regulation of prices for drugs on 
pharmaceutical companies´ R&D expenditures. I expected the R&D expenditures of 
companies, which make most of their profits in Europe to be lower than the R&D 
expenditures of companies that make most of their profits in the US. This expectation 
seems quite rational considering that there is generally more price regulation on 
pharmaceuticals in Europe meaning that drugs are cheaper in Europe compared to 
the US. As a consequence, companies are able to make more profit in the US and 
therefore they have more disposable capital to be invested in R&D to explore new 
medication. In figure 1 I plotted the relation between the logarithmic R&D 
expenditures divided by sales (l_s_rd_exp) of the 20 pharmaceutical companies used 
in the model and their market share in the EMEA region14 (share_emea). 
                                                          
14 Europe (East and West), Middle East and Africa. Of course the most important market within the 
EMEA market is Europe, so for simplicity the EMEA market can be equated with the European market.  
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The vertical axis represents the logarithmic R&D expenditures and the horizontal axis 
represents companies´ market shares in the EMEA region. Obviously, there seems to 
be a non-linear relationship between these two variables. The graph shows an 
inverted U shape, that is to say that at lower shares in EMEA R&D expenditures are 
increasing with the increment of market shares in the EMEA region up to a certain 
share of sales (“critical market share”) as from that R&D expenditures seem to be 
decreasing.  According to the plot the critical market share seems to be around 30 to 
35 percent meaning that a pharmaceutical company that makes more than 30 to 35 
percent of its sales in the EMEA region invests less or equal in R&D than a company, 
whose revenues have a lower ratio of revenues in the EMEA region of total sales. 
This finding is attributable to price regulation in the EMEA region, which is more 
distinctive than in the US and can be denoted as “regulation effect”. The reason for 
this regulation effect might be that it is not optimal for a pharmaceutical company in 
terms of profits and R&D expenditures to make most of its sales in the EMEA region 
due to the strict price regulation of drugs. An appropriate strategy to avoid the R&D 
loss might be to explore new markets where drug prices are not subject to regulation. 
Of course the EMEA market is important for multinational pharmaceutical companies 
due to its size and potential profits and, thus, at the beginning, R&D expenditures 
increase with the share of sales in the EMEA region, but if a pharmaceutical 
company is too concentrated on the EMEA market, it has a decreasing effect on R&D 
spending that is likely to be due to price regulation of drugs.  
By way of comparison I also plotted the logarithmic R&D expenditures divided by 
sales (l_s_rd_exp) of the selected 20 pharmaceutical companies and their market 
share in the North America region (figure 2). 
19
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The vertical axis represents the logarithmic R&D expenditures and the horizontal axis 
represents companies´ market shares in the North America region15. Again, there 
seems to be a non-linear relationship between these two variables, whereas it is not 
as distinctive as in EMEA. A significant difference can be observed comparing figure 
1 to figure 2. According to the plot, an increasing trend of R&D expenditures can be 
assessed with increasing companies´ share of sales. Drug prices in the US are not 
as regulated as in Europe, so companies can make more profit because they are 
able to sell their drugs at a higher price. Accordingly companies can attain more profit 
and they have more money to spend on R&D. Again, the graph shows that in case a 
pharmaceutical company is too concentrated on the US market and makes most of 
its sales in the US, it has a negative effect on R&D spending. However, the numbers 
seem to differ from the European case: Here, the “optimal” value of a firm’s 
engagement in the US lies probably around fifty to seventy percent. 
For the sake of completeness, I also plotted the logarithmic R&D expenditures of the 
selected 20 pharmaceutical companies and their market share in the rest of the world 
(figure 3). 
                                                          
15 For simplicity the North American market can be equated with the US market, since this is the most 
important market within the North American region.  
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figure 3: relationship between R&D expenditures and 
share of sales (rest of the world) 
 
Again, there seems to be a non-linear relationship between these two variables. It is 
striking to see that the rest of the world is not that important compared to the EMEA 
and the North American market related to the share of sales, because there seems to 
be a peak of frequency at 10 to 20 percent. According to the plot R&D expenditures 
are increasing up to a certain share of sales from that a decreasing trend can be 
observed. 
In summary it can be stated that it seems to be better for a pharmaceutical company 
to make more sales of its total sales on the US market in terms of R&D expenditures, 
because higher profits can be made selling their drugs due to the less regulated 
market. The EMEA region is also important for pharmaceutical companies, but profits 
are not that high due to drug price regulation. It might be optimal for a pharmaceutical 
company to be present on both markets, more focusing on the US market 
respectively in terms of profits and therefore R&D expenditures. 
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3.2. The Data 
 
The panel data set contains annual information of the world´s biggest 20 
pharmaceutical companies16 between 2000 and 2008. The following variables are 
included: R&D expenditures, cash flow, Tobin´s q, number of employees, debt, the 
growth of sales, share of the firms´ sales in EMEA region, share of sales in North 
America and share of sales in the rest of the world17.  The data set is unbalanced 
meaning that there are some missing data for selected companies and years. 
 
3.3. Summary statistics  
 
In table 1, the basic summary statistics for my key variables of my model are briefly 
shown. The columns contain the mean, standard deviation and number of 
observations of the variables. The number of observations sometimes differs among 
the variables due to their availability within the dataset. 
In the first row reveals that the mean of the variable R&D expenditures accounts for  
2 958 356 016 USD and has a standard deviation of 2 011 252 779 USD. The 
expenditures for R&D range from 252.83 million USD to 8.3 billion USD. This very 
broad range within the world´s biggest pharmaceutical companies is represented by 
the quite large standard deviation. 
An examination of the second row shows that the mean of cash flow is                       
4 618 063 880 USD with a standard deviation of 3 988 683 270 USD. Again, the 
variable´s broad range is responsible for the large standard deviation. 
Tobin´s Quotient is a dimensionless ratio between market value and total assets of a 
company that is used for the evaluation of a company. The resulting ratio measures 
the value of one unit capital relatively to its actual purchase price. The higher Tobin´s 
Q, the higher profit potential of deployed capital is estimated by financial markets. If 
the value of Tobin´s Q is bigger than 1, the company should do additional 
investments. In the used dataset the mean of Tobin´s Q is 2.43 and has a standard 
deviation of 1.69. 
                                                          
16 i.e. as measured in sales Abbot Laboratories, Amgen Inc., Astellas, AstraZeneca, Baxter, Bayer, 
Bristol Myers Squibb, Eisai, Eli Lilly, Glaxo Smith Kline, Johnson&Johnson, MSD Sharp&Dohme, 
Novartis, Novo Nordisk, Pfizer, Roche, Sanofi-Aventis, Schering-Plough, Takeda, Wyeth 
17 share of sales in Latin America + share of sales in Asia Pacific region  
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The number of employees is on average 58 996 and varies between 7 196 and     
166 900, with a standard deviation of 33 671.  
The debt of the companies has an average of 4 232 144 830 USD and a standard 
deviation of 4 041 986 580 USD. 
The companies´ mean annual growth of sales is 9 percent with a standard deviation 
of 15 percent.  
With a share of 46 percent and a standard deviation of 17 percent, companies 
generate most of their revenues in North America, followed by the EMEA region with 
a share of 29 percent and a standard deviation of 12 percent. Lastly, the share of 
sales in the rest of the world contributes 23 percent to their total sales with a standard 
deviation of 16 percent. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of the key variables
R&D expenditures 2 958 356 016 2 011 252 779 177
Cash flow 4 618 063 880 3 988 683 270 165
Tobin´s Q 2.43 1.69 162
Number of employees 58996 33671 169
Debt 4 232 144 830 4 041 986 580 177
Growth of sales 0.09 0.15 177
Share of sales in EMEA 
region 0.29 0.12 162
Share of sales in North 
America 0.46 0.17 162
Share of sales in the 
rest of the world 0.23 0.16 162
Variable Mean Number of observations
Standard 
deviation
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I also examined the correlations between the explanatory variables used in the model 
(table 2). The growth of sales is positively correlated with the logarithmic lagged cash 
flow with a correlation coefficient of 0.16, positively correlated with the share of sales 
obtained in the EMEA region with a correlation coefficient of 0.07, positively 
correlated with the and positively correlated with the share of sales made in the rest 
of the world with a correlation coefficient of 0.02. 
The growth of sales is negatively correlated with logarithmic debt divided by sales 
with a coefficient of -0.12, negatively correlated with Tobin´s Q with a coefficient of     
-0.02, negatively correlated with the logarithmic number of employees divided by 
sales with a coefficient of -0.02 and negatively correlated with the share of sales 
obtained in the US. 
 The logarithmic debt divided by sales is positively correlated with the logarithmic 
number of employees divided by sales with a correlation coefficient of 0.20, slightly 
positively correlated with the share of sales made in the EMEA region with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.004 and is positively correlated with the share of sales 
obtained in the US with a positive correlation coefficient of 0.22. 
The logarithmic debt divided by sales is negatively correlated with Tobin´s Q with a 
correlation coefficient of -0.14, negatively correlated with the logarithmic lagged cash 
flow with a coefficient of -0.13 and is negatively correlated with the share of sales 
made in the rest of the world with a coefficient of -0.30. 
Tobin´s Q is positively correlated with the logarithmic number of employees divided 
by sales with a correlation coefficient of 0.22, positively correlated with the 
logarithmic lagged cash flow with a correlation coefficient of 0.33 and positively 
correlated with the share of sales made in the US.  
The logarithmic number of employees divided by sales is positively correlated with 
the share of sales obtained in the EMEA region with a correlation coefficient of 0.61 
and positively correlated with the share of sales made in the rest of the world with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.08. 
The logarithmic number of employees divided by sales has a negative correlation 
with the logarithmic lagged cash flow with a correlation coefficient of -0.08 and a 
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negative correlation with the share of sales made in the US with a correlation 
coefficient of -0.48. 
The logarithmic lagged cash flow divided by sales is negatively correlated with the 
share of sales made in the EMEA region with a correlation coefficient of -0.13, 
negatively correlated with the share of sales obtained in the rest of the world with a 
correlation coefficient of -0.09. The logarithmic lagged cash flow divided by sales has 
a positive correlation with the share of sales made in the US with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.16. 
The share of sales in the EMEA region have a slight positive correlation with the 
share of sales made in the rest of the world with a correlation coefficient of 0.0063 
and have a negative correlation with the share of sales made in the US with a 
correlation coefficient of -0.68. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables
salesgr 1
l_s_debt -0.12 1
tobin -0.02 -0.14 1
l_s_employ -0.02 0.2 0.22 1
l_lag_s_cash_o
p
0.16 -0.13 0.33 -0.08 1
share_emea 0.07 0.004 -0.20 0.61 -0.13 1
share_emea2 0.11 0.008 -0.16 0.62 -0.10 0.98 1
share_rest 0.02 -0.3 -0.31 0.08 -0.09 0.006 0.02 1
share_us -0.06 0.22 0.36 -0.48 0.16 -0.68 -0.68 -0.73 1
share_ 
emea2
share_ 
rest
share
_ us
share_ 
emeasalesgr
l_s_ 
debt tobin
l_s_ 
employ
l_lag_s_c
ash_op
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3.4. Econometric Background 
 
Having a panel data set, I used the fixed effects model for my estimation. First I want 
to shortly discuss the advantages of a panel data set and then I want to argue, why a 
fixed effects model is more appropriate than a random effects model in this case. 
In general, there are three different types of data available for empirical analysis: time 
series, cross section and penal data. In a time series data set, values of selected 
variables are collected over a period of time, in a cross section data set values of one 
or more variables are collected at the same point in time for different subjects, such 
as individuals, firms or countries. Usually cross section data are used to compare the 
differences among the subjects. Panel data sets combine these two types of data 
sets by collecting data for different subjects (i. e. firms for my estimation) over a 
period of time. 
According to Baltagi there are some important advantages of panel data18: 
- There is heterogeneity within the data set, because variables for different subjects 
are observed over time. 
- Due to the combination of time series and cross-section observations, panel data 
provide more “informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, 
more degrees of freedom and more efficiency.”19 
- The dynamics of change can be better investigated using panel data because of the 
availability of repeated cross section observations. 
- There are effects that simply cannot be detected when using time series or cross 
section data. 
- Panel data allow examining more complicated behavioral models. For example, 
appearances like economies of scale or technological progress can be better 
described by panel data. 
                                                          
18 BALTAGI BADI H., (1995). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, John Wiley and Sons, New York 
19 BALTAGI BADI H., (1995). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, John Wiley and Sons, New York 
pp.  3-6 
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- Based on the availability of many data for different subjects´ variables over time, 
panel data might minimize the bias when aggregating subjects into broad 
aggregates. 
To sum it up, the use of panel data can enhance econometric analysis in such a 
manner that may not be possible using simply cross section or time series data, but 
we have to keep in mind, that there are also some caveats using panel data which 
will be addressed at the end of the chapter.            
 
3.5. The fixed effects model (FEM) 
 
I used the fixed effects model, because the pharmaceutical companies were not 
randomly chosen but chosen on their size related to sales. Another reason was that 
the individual error term ui might be correlated with the explanatory variables, 
because obviously the selected firms are no random sample. Additionally, there is no 
omitted variable problem with the fixed effects model. 
However, the fixed effects model has the disadvantage that the comparison can only 
take place within the observed firms (that’s why it is also called within-model), but not 
between the firms. For the latter, a between-model (or random-effects model) should 
be used. However, as argued above, these would yield biased results. 
To get a basic idea of the fixed effects model it can be regarded as OLS regression 
with a dummy variable for each company. There are of course many different 
approaches of the fixed effects model depending on the assumptions made about the 
intercept, the slope coefficient and the error term εi, but in the literature the following 
model is known as the general FEM: 
Yit = β1i20 + β2X2it + β3X3it +… + βnXnit + εit 
t = 1,2,…,T ; i = different subjects (i.e. companies) 
Where β1 denotes the intercept term, β are the different coefficients of the different 
variables X and εit denotes the error term. The subscript i on the intercept term 
indicates that the intercepts of the companies might differ across companies which 
represents the individuality of each company, but the intercept does not vary over 
                                                          
20 β1i can be also written as α1 + ui, where α1 denotes the constant and ui denotes companies` fixed 
effects 
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time (therefore the term “fixed effects”) and the slope coefficients are still regarded as 
constant. This difference might be explained through special features of each 
company like for example managerial style (i.e. fixed effects). In this fixed effects 
model the intercept is not considered to deviate over time, which is called time 
invariant. To take variation of the intercept into account dummy variables are 
implemented in the model for each company represented by ui. Just as dummy 
variables are used to represent an individual company effect, time dummy variables 
for each year can be added to take a time effect into account because of factors like 
technological changes or changes in government regulatory policies which are both 
very important for pharmaceutical companies. 
 
3.5.1. Caveats on the use of the fixed effects model 
Of course there are some problems that have to be faced using the fixed effects 
model: 
- There is a considerable loss of degrees of freedom when introducing too many 
dummy variables. Therefore, one needs a considerable amount of observations to 
use the fixed effects model. 
- Multicollinearity may occur when using many variables, which can make the precise 
estimation of one or more parameters difficult 
- The error term εit might be a problem when it is assumed to follow the classical 
assumptions εit ~ N(0, σ2). This assumption may be modified because the i index 
represents cross-sectional observations and the t index represents time series 
observations. This problem can be solved by assuming that the error variance is 
heteroscedastic or that the error term is not autocorrelated.    
 
3.6. The random effects model 
 
The random effects model provides an approach not to lose many degrees of 
freedom due to the use of dummy variables expressing this ignorance through the 
disturbance term uit. The basic model is: 
Yit = β1i + β2X2it + β3X3it +… + βnXnit + uit 
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 Compared to the fixed effects model β1i is not considered as fixed, but it is assumed 
to be a random variable with a mean of β1. The intercept value of β1i for each 
company can be described as: 
β1i = β1 + εi 
where εi denotes the random error term fulfilling the criteria N(0, σε2). For this reason 
the random effects model contains two (or more) errors: εi which denotes the cross-
section, or individual specific, error component and uit, which denotes the combined 
time series and cross-section error component. The main idea behind this model is 
that the selected companies for the model are a randomly chosen from a very large 
sample of such companies and that they have a mean value for the intercept β1 and 
the individual differences in the intercept term are considered by the error term εi21. 
Since εi is not directly observable, it is called an unobservable or latent variable.        
 
3.7. Fixed effects model or random effects model 
 
To pick the “correct” model is sometimes quite challenging and strongly dependent 
on the assumptions that have been made about the error component εi. If εi is not 
considered to be correlated with the independent variables, then the random effects 
model might be the suitable model and if εi is considered to be correlated with the 
independent variables, then the fixed effects model might be the suitable model.  
One main assumption of the random effects model is that the unobserved effect εi is 
a random drawing from a very large sample. A simple example can show that 
sometimes this assumption might be violated. In case we want to do research on the 
unemployment rate across the 50 states in the US, the assumption that the 50 states 
are a random sample is not feasible. This was also one of the reasons I decided to 
use the fixed effects model for my estimation, because the pharmaceutical 
companies were not randomly chosen but chosen on their size related to sales.    
                                                          
21 “In FEM each cross-sectional unit has its own (fixed) intercept value, in all N such values for N 
cross-sectional units” see GUJARATI DAMODAR N., PORTER DAWN C., (2009) Basic Econometrics: 
Fifth Edition, Mcgraw-Hill Higher Education p.648 
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Of course there are some more criteria to pick the correct choice between the fixed 
effects model and the random effects model, but listing them all would go beyond the 
scope of my thesis, nevertheless I want to briefly comment on the most important22: 
- Significant differences in the estimates of the fixed effects model and the random 
effects model can occur when N (number of cross-sectional units) is large and T 
(number of time series data) is small. Consider that in the random effects model εi is 
the cross-sectional random component, while in the fixed effects model β1i is treated 
as fixed. The assumption that β1i is fixed seems valid when the individual, or cross-
sectional units in the sample are to be thought of as not randomly drawn from a 
larger sample. If this is the case, the fixed effects model is suitable. On the other 
hand, if the cross-sectional units in the sample are considered to be randomly drawn 
from a very large sample, the random effects model is suitable. Since the selected 
companies for my estimation were not randomly chosen but on their size related to 
sales, I chose the fixed effects model.  
- If εi is correlated with one or more independent variables, the random effects model 
provides biased results, whereas in the fixed model ui is allowed to be correlated with 
the independent variables. Since it might be possible, that ui is correlated with my 
regressors, I decided in favor of the fixed effects model. 
- The random effects model is more efficient than the fixed effects model, when N is 
large, T is small and its assumptions are not violated.  
 
3.8. Empirical Part 
 
In my model my dependent variable is the logarithmic R&D expenditures divided by 
sales (l_s_rd_exp), the set of explanatory variables includes: 
• salesgr: growth of sales in percent 
• l_s_debt: logarithmic debt (USD) divided by sales (USD) 
• tobin: Tobin´s Q 
• l_s_employ: logarithmic number of employees divided by sales (USD) 
                                                          
22 GRIFFITHS WILLIAM E., HILL CARTER R., JUDGE GEORGE G., LEE TSOUNG-CHAO, 
LÜTKEPOHL HELMUT, (1988). Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Econometrics: Second 
Edition, Wiley pp. 489 - 491 
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• l_lag_s_cash_op: logarithmic cash flow (USD) divided by sales (USD) of 
period t-1 
• share_emea: share of sales in EMEA region 
• share_emea2: squared share of sales in EMEA region 
• share_us: share of sales in North America 
• share_rest: share of sales in the rest of the world  
 
The variable share of sales in North America is also not included23, because it is 
used as reference variable meaning that the coefficients of share_emea, 
share_emea2 and share_rest represent a comparison with the share of sales made 
in the US. 
The equation of my fixed effects model reads as follows: 
Log(rd_exp/sales)it = α1 + β1log(salesgr)it + β2log(debt/sales)it + β3tobinit + 
β4log(employees/sales)it + β5log(lagged cash flow/sales)it + β6(share_emea)it + 
β7(share_emea2)it + β8(share_rest_rev)it + ui + εit 
t = 2000,2001,…,2008 and i = 1,2,…,20 
where α1 denotes the constant, βn denote the different coefficients of the independent 
variables, ui denote the companies´ fixed effects and εit denotes the error term which 
is independent and identically distributed. Table 3 illustrates my empirical findings. By 
way of comparison I also performed a random effects estimate in order to compare 
my results out of the fixed effects estimation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 There can always only put (n-1) dummy variables into a model, using the omitted variable as 
reference variable 
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Table 3: Differences between random and fixed effects
constant
salesgr
l_s_debt
tobin
l_s_employ
l_lag_s_ca~p
share_emea~v
share_emea2
share_rest~v
Notes: ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10 respectively.
              p-values in parentheses
number of 
observations 121 121
(0.066) (0.028)
-0.8670** 0.0786
(0.015) (0.919)
2.1176 3.8502*
(0.179) (0.058)
-3.9456* -5.7044**
(0.053) (0.071)
0.0062 0.0242
(0.780) (0.471)
-0.0197 -0.0159
(0.145) (0.252)
-0.1107* -0.1057*
(0.134) (0.089)
-0.0585*** -0.0631***
(0.000) (0.000)
-2.7894*** -3.2974***
(0.000) (0.000)
0.0978 0.1153*
explanatory 
variables random effects fixed effects
Dependent Variables
l_s_rd_exp l_s_rd_exp
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We can see that there are some significant variables. The variable salesgr with a p-
value of 0.08 is significant at 10 percent-level with a coefficient of 0.11, which means 
that an increase of 1 percentage of salesgr will result in an increase of 11 percent of 
R&D expenditures. This result is quite comprehensible, because an increase of 
pharmaceutical companies´ sales is usually accompanied with an increase of profits, 
thus there is more capital that can be invested in R&D. The variable l_s_debt is 
highly significant at 1 percent-level with a p-value of 0.00 with a coefficient of -0.06. If 
there is an increase in l_s_debt of one percent, there will be a decline of R&D 
expenditures of 0.1 percent. This finding goes along with rational expectations that 
an increase of companies´ debts yields a decrease in R&D investments, because 
less capital is disposable for investments. The regressor l_s_employ is significant 
with a p-value of 0.07 at 10 per cent-level with a coefficient of -0.10. Increasing 
l_s_employ by one percent goes hand in hand with a 0.1 percent decrease of R&D 
expenditures. This result meets my expectations, because the number of employees 
is an important cost factor for the pharmaceutical industry and therefore is consistent 
that more employees will result in less available money to be invested in R&D.  
The most important variables for my research are the share of sales in the EMEA and 
the squared shares of sales in the EMEA region. I used these two variables as 
regulation proxies, and we can see, that both of the variables are significantly 
different from zero, whereas share_emea is significant with a p-value of 0.05 at 5 
percent-level with a positive coefficient of 3.85 and share_emea2 is highly significant 
with a p-value of 0.02 at 5 percent-level with a negative coefficient of 5.70. These two 
coefficients completely meet my expectations, because the R&D investments are 
increasing until a critical market share in the EMEA region and from that value R&D 
investments are decreasing compared to the shares of sales made in the US. 
Referred to the R&D expenditures for a pharmaceutical company it is better to have 
higher shares of sales in the US market up to a certain value, because higher prices 
can be achieved for their drugs due to a lack of price regulation. This can be 
interpreted as evidence that the strict price regulation of drugs in the EMEA region 
has a negative impact of pharmaceutical companies´ R&D spending and can be 
made responsible for a loss of new innovative drugs. The higher the share of sales 
made in the EMEA region, the higher is the negative impact of the squared term, in 
other words the more sales a company makes in the EMEA region beyond the 
optimal market share, the higher is the R&D investment loss compared if a company 
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had made more shares of its sales in the US. In order to avoid losses of R&D 
investment due to the strict price regulation in the EMEA region, a company should 
not make more sales beyond the optimal or critical market share in the EMEA region. 
Since my model contains a share of sales in the EMEA region term and its squared 
term, the optimal market share for a company in the EMEA region can be computed 
easily through differentiation: 
First, recall my model: 
y = α1 + β1log(salesgr)it + β2(debt/sales)it + β3tobinit + β4log(employees/sales)it + 
β5log(lagged cash flow/sales)it + β6(share_emea)it + β7(share_emea)it2 + 
β8(share_rest)it + ui + εit 
Differentiating y with respect to share_emea yields:  
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑥
=  𝛽6 +  2𝛽7(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑎) = 0 
In order to maximize, I set the equation zero and rearrange it: 
(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑎) = −  𝛽62𝛽7 
If we plug in the value of the coefficients of β6 (3.85) and β7 (-5.70) the equation 
yields 0.33. The optimal market share for the EMEA region of a pharmaceutical 
company is therefore 33 percent. This optimal market share also meets my 
expectations, because when we go back to fig 1 in the hypothesis part we can see, 
that a share of sales beyond 33 percent in the EMEA region results in decreasing 
R&D expenditures. 
By way of comparison I also performed a random effects estimation with exactly the 
same variables as to use it as “robustness check”. My findings are also illustrated in 
table 3. 
The independent variable salesgr now has turned insignificantly, but with a p-value of 
0.13 it can be regarded as trend. With a positive coefficient of 0.09 it almost equals 
the coefficient of salesgr in the fixed effects estimation. The regressor l_s_debt is 
again significantly different from zero with a p-value of 0.00 with a coefficient of -0.05 
it almost equals the value of the coefficient of the fixed effects estimation. The 
variable l_s_employ is significant at the 5 percent-level with a coefficient of -0.11, 
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which closely matches with the coefficient of the fixed effects estimation. The 
regulation proxy share_emea has turned insignificantly, but the algebraic sign 
remains the same compared to the fixed effects estimation. The squared 
share_emea term is again significantly different from zero with a p-value of 0.06. The 
coefficient value of -3.94 is similar to the value estimated by the fixed effects 
approach. The squared term can be considered to have more weight that the regular 
share_emea term, because the higher the share of sales made in the EMEA region, 
the higher is the negative impact of the squared term. 
To sum it up the findings of the random effects estimation go along with the results of 
the fixed effects estimation, the value of the coefficients are quite similar and 
coefficients´ algebraic signs equal. Hence the results of the fixed effects approach 
can be regarded as robust.       
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Chapter 4 
 
 
4.1. Conclusion 
 
Price regulation of pharmaceuticals can theoretically contribute to society´s total 
utility by lowering drug prices that might result in lower costs per use and therefore 
greater use, which could lead to reduced costs of care. Conversely, the costs of 
regulation might exceed this effect when considering the reduced R&D spending and 
the delayed launches of new drugs. In my thesis I tried to find an approach to make 
the effect of price regulation on R&D expenditures detectable. Usually 
pharmaceutical companies are present on both markets, the EMEA market and the 
US market. To use the shares of sales in the different regions as regulation proxy 
was quite a good approach to show that in a regulated market R&D investments are 
decreasing compared to a less regulated market. The negative influence of price 
regulation on pharmaceutical companies´ R&D investments cannot be denied and is 
shown empirically in my thesis. I could also show, that for a pharmaceutical company 
the optimal market share in the EMEA region is 35 percent related to R&D 
expenditures, beyond this value the “regulation effect” becomes important and 
reduces companies´ R&D spending. It also seems consistent that a less regulated 
drug market makes it possible for companies to realize higher prices for their drugs 
and therefore more capital can be invested in R&D, which is important for the 
development of new innovative drugs. The more difficult question is to exactly 
quantify the loss of R&D spending due to price regulation in the EMEA market. Of 
course pharmaceutical companies are globally acting and the EMEA region is an 
important sales market, but for a firm it seems better not to be too concentrated on 
the EMEA market because there the prices of drugs are more regulated compared to 
the US market.      
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Abstract (German) 
 
Der Zweck meiner Diplomarbeit war zu zeigen wie sich Preisregulierung von 
Medikamenten auf die R&D Investitionen von Pharmafirmen auswirken. Zu diesem 
Thema gibt es bereits einige Veröffentlichungen, die ich im ersten Teil meiner 
Diplomarbeit kurz zusammenfasse. Danach bin ich auf die vorherrschenden 
Regulierungs-Schemata, die verwendet werden um Arzneimittelpreise zu regulieren, 
eingegangen und habe ihre möglichen Effekte diskutiert. Der wichtigste Teil meiner 
Arbeit war der empirische Teil in dem ich den Einfluss von Preisregulierung auf R&D 
Ausgaben untersuchte. Für meine Schätzung verwendete ich ein Panel-Datensatz, 
der die größten Pharmafirmen enthielt bezogen auf die Umsätze im Zeitraum von 
2000 bis 2008. Als Maß für Preisregulierung verwendete ich den Anteil am Umsatz in 
der EMEA Region, den Anteil am Umsatz in den USA und den Anteil am Umsatz im 
Rest der Welt unter der Annahme, dass in der EMEA Region die Preise stärker 
reguliert sind verglichen mit den USA. Das Hauptresultat von meiner fixed-effects 
Schätzung ist, dass Preisregulierung eine signifikante negative Auswirkung auf R&D 
Investitionen von Pharmafirmen haben. Dieser negative Effekt wird sogar verstärkt, je 
höher der Anteil am Umsatz in der EMEA Region einer Firma ist. Zum Vergleich 
habe ich auch noch eine random-effects Schätzung mit denselben Variablen 
durchgeführt, die übereinstimmende Ergebnisse liefert.     
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